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What is immoral about eugenics?
Abstract
It is a "given" in discussions of genetic engineering that no sensible person can be in favour of eugenics.
The main reason for this presumption is that so much horror, misery, and mayhem have been carried out
in the name of eugenics in the 20th century that no person with any moral sense could think otherwise. In
fact, the abysmal history of murder and sterilisation undertaken in the name of race hygiene and the
"improvement" of the human species again and again in this century is so overpowering that the risk of
reoccurrence, sliding down what has proved time and time again to be an extremely slick, slippery slope,
does seem enough to bring all ethical argument in favour of eugenics to an end.
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It is a “given” in discussions of genetic engineering that no sensible person can be in favour of eugenics. The main reason
for this presumption is that so much horror, misery, and mayhem have been carried out in the name of eugenics in the
20th century that no person with any moral sense could think otherwise.1–3 In fact, the abysmal history of murder and
sterilisation undertaken in the name of race hygiene and the “improvement” of the human species again and again in this
century is so overpowering that the risk of reoccurrence, sliding down what has proved time and time again to be an
extremely slick, slippery slope, does seem enough to bring all ethical argument in favour of eugenics to an end.

Summary points
The horrible abuses committed in the name of eugenics
through coercive policies imposed by governments have
obscured the fact that eugenic goals can be the subject of
choice as well as coercion
In the rush to map the human genome and reap the
benefits of new genetic knowledge it has become
commonplace to argue that eugenic goals will play no part in
how new genetic knowledge is used
The moral case against voluntary choices to advance
eugenic goals by individuals or couples has not been
persuasively made
Given the power and authority granted to parents to seek
to improve or better their children by environmental
interventions, at least some forms of genetic selection or
alteration seem equally ethically defensible if they are
undertaken freely and do not disempower or disadvantage
children

However, before dismissing any favourable stance towards
eugenics it is important to distinguish what has happened in the
past under the banner of eugenics and what might happen in the
future. It is important to distinguish between genetic changes
undertaken with respect to improving a group or population and
genetic change that takes a single individual as its focus.
Efforts to change the genetic makeup of a group or population almost always require third parties to be involved in the personal reproductive choices of individuals and couples. Someone
besides the individuals making children has to set a policy and a
standard. In our century these efforts have almost always incorporated force or coercion since individuals may not agree with
the policy or third parties may seek to force their vision of
improvement on an unwilling population.
It is, however, a different matter for couples to undertake
their own efforts to use genetic technologies and knowledge to
improve the potential of their offspring. Eugenics has not, until
the advent of genetic engineering, offered this option. Efforts to
change the inherited genetic makeup of a particular person may
be the result of third party involvement, but it is far more likely
that such efforts will be the result of individual reproductive
choice.4 To put the point another way, population eugenics
involves commanding people to produce desired genotypic or
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phenotypic traits. This sort of eugenics is not the same as allowing an individual or couple voluntarily to choose a heritable trait
in their sperm, egg, embryo, or fetus, motivated by their view of
what is good or desirable.
The most common arguments against any attempt to either
avoid a trait through germline genetic engineering or to create
more children with desired traits fall into three categories:
worries about the presence of force or compulsion, the imposition of arbitrary standards of perfection,4 or inequities that might
arise from allowing the practice of eugenic choice.5 The first
worry is not one that seems insurmountable as an objection to
allowing individual choice about germline changes. The latter two
may also not discount eugenic choices.
Coercion
Certainly it is morally objectionable for governments or institutions or any third party to compel or coerce anyone’s
reproductive behaviour.1 3 The right to reproduce without interference from third parties is one of the fundamental freedoms recognised by international law and moral theories from a host of
ethical traditions. However, the goals of obtaining perfection,
avoiding disease, or pursuing health with respect to individuals
need not involve coercion or force.
A couple may wish to have a baby who has no risk of inheriting Tay-Sachs disease or transmitting sickle cell disease. Or
they may want a child with a particular hair colour or sex. If their
choice is free and informed then there is no reason to think that
such a choice is immoral on grounds of force or coercion.
The subjectivity of perfection
Some who find the pursuit of perfection morally
objectionable worry about more than coercion. They note that it
is simply not clear which traits or attributes are properly
perceived as perfect or optimal. The decision about what trait or
behaviour is good or healthy depends on the environment,
culture, and circumstances that a child will face. Stigma and
prejudice need not be the inevitable result of choice.
Views about what is perfect or desirable in a human being
are, more often than not, matters of taste, culture, and personal
experience. But they are not always simply the product of
subjective feelings. There are certain traits—physical stamina,
strength, speed, mathematical ability, dexterity, and acuity of
vision, to name only a few—that are related to health in ways
that command universal assent as to their desirability. It would
1
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be hard to argue that a parent who wanted a child with better
memory or greater physical dexterity was simply indulging his or
her biases or prejudices. As long as people are not forced to
make choices about their children that are in conformity with
particular visions of what is good or bad, healthy or unhealthy,
there would seem to be enough consensus about the desirability of some traits to permit parents to make individual choices
about the traits of their children in the name of their health. And
if no coercion of compulsion were involved it could even be
argued that parents should be free to pick the eyebrow shape or
freckle pattern of their children or other equally innocuous traits
as long as their selection imposed no risk for the child, did not
compromise the child’s chance of maximising his or her opportunities, or lead to parents becoming overly invested in superficial aspects of the child’s appearance or behaviour.4 6
A parent might concede that their vision of perfection is to
some degree subjective but still insist on the right to pursue it.
Since we accept this point of view with respect to child rearing,
allowing parents to teach their children religious values, hobbies,
and customs as they see fit, it would be difficult to reject it as
overly subjective when matters turn to the selection of a genetic
endowment for their child.
For many years cosmetic surgeons, psychoanalysts, and
sports medicine specialists have been plying their trades without
all people with big noses or poor posture feeling they need to
visit specialists to have these traits altered. Some people choose
to avail themselves of these specialists in the pursuit of perfection. Many do not. If there is a slope from permitting individual
choice of one’s child’s traits to limiting the choices available to
parents it is a slope that does not start with individual choice.
And if there is a problem of a slope then it must be shown why it
is morally permissible for parents to seek betterment after a child
is born but why such efforts are wrong if genetic alteration is
used. There is nothing terrible about subjectivity in a decision to
indulge preferences about the traits of one’s child as long as
those preferences do nothing to hurt or impair the child.

2

Equality
Another objection to allowing eugenic desires to influence
parenting is that this will lead to fundamental social inequalities.5
Allowing parental choice about the genetic makeup of their children may lead to the creation of a genetic “overclass” with unfair
advantages over those who parents did not or could not afford to
endow them with the right biological dispositions and traits. Or it
may lead to homogenisation in society where diversity and difference disappear in a rush to produce only perfect people, leaving
anyone with the slightest disability or deficiency at a distinct disadvantage. Equity and fairness are certainly important concepts
in societies that are committed to the equality of opportunity for
all. However, a belief that everyone deserves a fair chance may
mean that society must do what it can to insure that the means
to implementing eugenic choices are available to all who desire
them. It may also mean that a strong obligation exists to try and
compensate for any differences in biological endowment with
special programmes and educational opportunities. It is hard to
argue in a world that currently tolerates so much inequity in the
circumstances under which children are brought into being that
there is something more offensive or more morally problematic
about biological advantages as opposed to social and economic
advantages.
It is difficult to argue in a world that tolerates the creation of
homogeneity through the parental selection of schools, music
lessons, religious training, or summer camps that only
environmentally engineered homogeneity is morally licit. The fact
that those people with privileged social backgrounds go on to
similar sorts of educational and life experiences does not seem
sufficient reason to interfere with parental choice.
No moral principle seems to provide sufficient reason to
condemn individual eugenic goals. While force and coercion,
compulsion and threat have no place in procreative choice, and
while individual decisions can have negative collective
consequences, it is not clear that it is any less ethical to allow
parents to pick the eye colour of their child or to try and create a
fetus with a propensity for mathematics than it is to permit them
to teach their children the values of a particular religion, try to
inculcate a love of sports by taking them to football games, or to
require them to play the piano. In so far as coercion and force
are absent and individual choice is allowed to hold sway, then
presuming fairness in the access to the means of enhancing our
offsprings’ lives it is hard to see what exactly is wrong with parents choosing to use genetic knowledge to improve the health
and wellbeing of their offspring.
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